
















that	there	is	an	intelligent	designer	responds	to	evidence	to	some	extent.			 Apologists	often	urge	that	their	religious	texts	are	historical	documents	or	even	“eye-witness	accounts.”	Christian	apologists,	for	example,	often	claim	that	the	resurrection	is	supported	by	historical	evidence,	namely,	the	Gospels.	So	even	if	no	religious	texts	are	in	fact	historically	accurate	(or	if	all	their	supernatural	portions	are	unhistorical),	the	fact	that	apologists	seem	to	care	about	their	historical	status	suggests	that	credences	based	on	them	might	respond	to	evidence	in	some	way.			 Systematic	theology	in	various	traditions	(Christian,	Jewish,	Hindu,	Muslim)	attempts	to	make	theistic	doctrines	cohere	with	one	another,	as	well	as	with	observations	of	nature	and	canonical	texts.	The	credences	that	issue	from	systematic	theology	therefore	seem	somewhat	responsive	to	evidence	in	virtue	of	these	demands	for	coherence	and	consistency	with	texts	and	natural	data.			 People	often	talk	as	if	unlikely	fortunes	are	evidence	for	their	religious	credences.	If	a	person	prays	in	a	tiny	boat	in	a	deadly	storm	and	lives,	she	might	claim	that	such	unlikely	fortune	shows	that	her	god	is	real.	Skeptics	respond	that	this	test	is	biased,	because	its	disconfirming	instances	drown.	Nevertheless,	biased	appeal	to	evidence	may	be	responsiveness	in	some	weak	sense,	so	appeal	to	unlikely	fortunes	may	suggest	that	some	religious	credences	respond	to	evidence.			 On	the	other	hand,	some	rejections	of	religious	credences	also	suggest	that	they	respond	to	evidence.	Some	people	claim	that	encounter	with	science	caused	them	to	lose	religious	faith.	Religious	credences	are	the	descriptive	cognitive	attitudes	in	the	psychological	cluster	constituting	faith;	if	they	were	not	responsive	to	evidence,	the	claim	that	science	caused	one	to	lose	faith	would	seem	to	make	little	
																																																								3	And	Ockham’s	Razor	then	cuts	the	non-explanatory	intelligent	designer	from	our	ontology.	
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2.3	Theoretical	Options		 Some	religious	credences	seem	to	respond	to	evidence	and	some	don’t.	So	do	religious	credences	respond	to	evidence	or	not?	How	should	we	solve	this	puzzle?	I	see	three	strategies.			 First,	we	might	say	religious	credences	do	respond	to	evidence	and	attempt	to	explain	away	the	apparent	unresponsiveness	in	the	just-cited	phenomena	as	due	to	overriding	factors,	such	as	emotions	or	social	pressure.	Alternately,	one	might	say	some	features	of	the	contents	of	credence	systems	make	these	attitudes	immune	to	evidential	refutation,	even	if	the	attitudes	themselves	are	evidentially	responsive.		 Second,	we	might	say	that	religious	credences	don’t	respond	to	evidence,	arguing	that	other	psychological	facts	explain	the	appearance	of	responsiveness	in	some	cases.		 Third,	we	might	divide	and	conquer,	maintaining	that	some	religious	credences	respond	to	evidence	and	some	don’t.			 I	find	the	first	strategy	is	unpromising:	the	examples	of	unresponsiveness	are	too	striking	for	us	to	maintain	that	religious	credences	generally	respond	to	evidence.	Furthermore,	I	explain	in	section	4	why	I	think	a	“content	only”	approach	to	explaining	evidential	unresponsiveness	is	unlikely	to	work.	So	my	approach	combines	the	second	and	third	strategies,	leaning	more	on	the	second.	My	nod	to	the	third	strategy	(“divide	and	conquer”)	is	this.	Though	the	vast	majority	of	religious	credences	are	not	evidentially	vulnerable	(a	notion	I	explain	below),	some	of	them	might	be.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	properties	that	characterize	religious	credence	define	a	region	in	a	multi-dimensional	property	space;	religious	credences	form	a	cluster	in	this	region.	It	is	possible,	however,	that	some	attitudes	with	most	features	of	religious	credence	stray	from	the	cluster	with	respect	to	one	or	two	of	the	properties.	In	one	kind	of	case,	a	rare	credence	might	in	fact	respond	to	evidence.	Call	an	attitude	like	this	a	religious#credence.	It	is	perfectly	normal	for	clusters	in	multi-dimensional	spaces	to	have	fuzzy	edges,	even	if	there	are	reasons	why	the	cluster	as	a	whole	hangs	together	and	forms	an	
attractor	position	(Sperber	1996;	McCauley	and	Lawson	2002).			 Still,	most	examples	of	apparent	responsiveness	to	evidence	on	the	part	of	religious	credences	are	suspicious.	They	seem	like	opportunistic	justifications	for	clinging	to	what	one	was	going	to	cling	to	anyway.	Furthermore,	genuine	responsiveness	to	evidence	would	undermine	some	other	cultural	functions	religious	credences	characteristically	have.	For	example,	the	evidential	immobility	of	credences	makes	them	good	indicators	of	allegiance	to	a	religious	in-group:																																																									11	Boudry	and	Coyne	(2016a)	suggest	that	many	of	the	unusual	properties	of	religious	“beliefs”	can	be	explained	by	appealing	to	their	vague,	semi-propositional	contents.	Religious	beliefs	are	different	from	factual	beliefs,	on	this	view,	not	because	the	attitude	is	different,	but	because	the	contents	are	wishy-washy.	My	point	here	is	that	that	strategy	can’t	always	work	for	explaining	the	differences,	especially	when	it	comes	to	pervasive	unresponsiveness	to	evidence.		
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	 Let’s	regiment	the	central	notions	needed	for	understanding	make-believe.	Doing	this	sets	us	up	for	understanding	religious	enactment.	(The	specific	regimentation	below	is	my	own,	but	it	follows	Walton’s	theory	closely.)			 (a) A	game	of	make-believe	is	a	game	in	which	it	is	prescribed	that	one	imagine	certain	propositions	according	to	certain	rules,	where	imagining	is	a	
cognitive	attitude	distinct	from	factual	belief.	(Example:	in	the	bears	game,	upon	seeing	a	stump	one	is	supposed	to	imagine	it	is	a	bear;	this	is	a	































	 Where	are	we	so	far?	I	made	it	clear	in	section	2	that	there	is	a	puzzle	about	whether	religious	credences	respond	to	evidence.	Some	appear	to	respond	to	evidence,	and	some	do	not.	But	I	claimed	that	the	appearance	that	they	do	is	unconvincing,	since	they	are	not	evidentially	vulnerable	in	the	sense	that	is	relevant	to	characterizing	the	space	of	cognitive	attitudes	as	a	whole.	This	claim	put	me	in	the	position	of	having	to	explain	where	the	deceptive	appearances	of	evidential	responsiveness	come	from;	to	explain	this,	I	developed	the	notion	of	The	Evidence	Game.			 I	now	consider	an	alternate	possible	explanation	of	the	data.	Maarten	Boudry	and	Johan	Braeckman	(2012)	argue	that	systematic	features	of	the	contents	of	religious	“belief”	systems	render	such	systems	immune	to	disconfirmation.	For	example,	they	point	out	that	religious	predictions	(or	other	ideological	predictions)	often	have	“multiple	end	points”:	a	prediction	will	come	with	a	literal	interpretation	and	a	metaphorical	interpretation,	which	immunizes	the	underlying	“beliefs”	against	disconfirmation.	Alternately,	religious	and	other	thought	systems	often	come	with	conspiracy	thinking	and	invisible	escape	clauses,	which	make	it	hard	for	data	to	impinge	on	them.	If	all	this	is	so,	one	might	attempt	to	develop	a	“content	only”	explanation	for	why	religious	attitudes	often	fail	to	respond	to	evidence:	it’s	not	that	their	attitude	type	is	any	different—as	attitudes,	they’re	just	“beliefs”	like	any	other	evidentially	vulnerable	belief—rather	their	contents	alone	make	them	immune.27			 This	suggestion28	deserves	a	fuller	treatment	than	I	can	give	here.	But	let	me	give	reasons	why	I	am	skeptical.	To	be	clear,	I	am	not	skeptical	of	the	claim	that	many	religious	“beliefs”	have	self-immunizing	contents;	Boudry	and	Braeckman	are	right	about	that.	Rather,	I	am	skeptical	of	the	view	that	all	the	data	that	need	to	be	explained	can	be	handled	well	by	a	“content	only”	view.	First	and	foremost,	a	view	like	this	seems	to	predict	that	exposure	to	evidence	would	be	a	more	common	reason	why	people	abandon	religious	“beliefs”	than	it	actually	is:	people	with	evidentially	vulnerable	religious	attitudes	would	often	eventually	see	through	the																																																																																																																																																																						theory	of	The	Evidence	Game	is	meant	as	an	explanation	of	why	a	given	kind	of	attitude	would	appear	evidentially	responsive,	whether	or	not	it	is;	however,	the	fact	that	an	attitude	is	a	product	of	The	Evidence	Game	does	not	entail	that	that	attitude	is	invulnerable	to	evidence.	It’s	just	part	of	what	I	think	is	our	best	overall	theory	of	the	data,	including	many	examples,	that	religious	credences	are	not	vulnerable	to	evidence.	But	our	best	overall	theory	of	scientific	attitudes	will	be	much	different.	Correspondingly,	the	resemblance	of	scientific	practice	to	The	Evidence	Game	does	not	entail	that	scientific	attitudes	are	not	vulnerable	to	evidence.	This	worry	can	also	be	flipped	around.	One	might	say	that,	since	The	Evidence	Game	resembles	scientific	practice	and	scientific	practice	does	respond	to	evidence,	The	Evidence	Game	responds	to	evidence	too.	My	response	here	is	to	grant	that	The	Evidence	Game	might	involve	“evidence	responsiveness”	in	some	weaker	sense,	but	it	does	not	yield	the	property	of	evidential	vulnerability,	which	is	the	form	of	evidential	responsiveness	that	is	relevant	to	distinguishing	cognitive	attitudes.	So	I	can	grant	this	version	of	the	worry,	while	still	maintaining	my	overall	thesis.		27	The	Boudry	and	Braeckman	paper	does	not	argue	that	religious	“beliefs”	are	just	like	any	other	doxastic	attitude;	however,	their	account	makes	that	argument	available—which	is	a	challenge	to	my	view—by	attempting	to	explain	the	surprising	features	of	religious	“beliefs”	by	appeal	to	structural	features	of	their	contents.	One	might	think,	on	reading	their	paper,	that	it	renders	an	attitude	approach,	such	as	I	take,	unnecessary.	28	Due	to	an	anonymous	referee.	
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thicket	of	misleading	contents	and	start	to	reject	their	evidentially	refuted	religious	doctrines;	otherwise	put,	evidentially	vulnerable	religious	beliefs,	even	with	content	features	that	Boudry	and	Braeckman	identify,	would	be	much	more	unstable	than	we	in	fact	see.	Now,	sometimes	exposure	to	evidence	does	seem	to	undermine	religious	credence,	as	I	discuss	in	the	next	section,	but	this	is	not	how	departure	from	religious	usually	works.	Rather,	people	tend	to	leave	religions,	when	they	do,	for	social	and	moral	reasons;	they	only	rarely	abandon	religious	credences	due	to	evidence	(Roozen	1980;	Sauvayre	2011).	Second,	most	religious	people	just	don’t	seem	to	care	about	evidence	for	their	credences.	The	Evidence	Game	is	played	mostly	by	intellectuals	and	apologists.	The	more	usual	lack	of	concern	with	evidence	suggests	to	me	that	something	about	the	attitude	itself	is	evidentially	invulnerable.	Third,	we	have	to	ask	how	the	self-immunizing	contents	get	there	in	the	first	place.	Boudry	and	Braeckman	suggest	that	they	are	the	product	of	cultural	evolution:	religious	“belief”	systems	that	didn’t	have	them	were	weeded	out	historically;	ones	that	did	have	them	survived.	To	me,	however,	this	suggests	a	much	too	passive	picture	of	how	the	self-immunizing	contents	of	religious	credences	are	generated.29	It	is	not	as	if	they	are	stumbled	upon	by	passive	ideational	mutation;	rather,	they	often	appear	to	be	actively	generated	on	the	fly—often	improvised	by	lay	people	and	“experts”	alike	(Boyer	2001:	302;	Legare	and	Gelman	2008:	636).	And	if	it’s	true	that	the	religious	often	invent	self-immunizing	strategies	for	their	beliefs,	then	it	is	likely	that	those	very	strategies	are	the	products	of	the	sorts	of	creative	processes	that	I	identify	in	this	paper.	But	those	creative	processes—religious	enactment	and	The	Evidence	Game—are	characteristic	of	religious	credence	and	not	of	factual	belief,	which	sits	ill	with	a	“content	only”	explanation	of	the	data	in	question.			 There	is	much	more	on	this	matter	to	be	said.	But	at	least,	at	this	point,	my	reasons	for	positing	an	attitude-based	explanation	of	the	evidential	invulnerability	of	religious	credences—as	opposed	to	a	“content	only”	explanation—should	be	clear.	
	
	
5	Conclusion:	Evidence	and	Apostates		 	The	main	reason	for	adopting	the	Evidence	Game	Thesis	and	its	corresponding	theory	is	that	they	solve	the	puzzle	presented	in	section	2.	They	explain	the	appearance	of	evidence	responsiveness	on	the	part	of	religious	credences:	that	appearance	is	due	to	The	Evidence	Game.	But	the	discussion	so	far	has	made	three	other	reasons	for	agreeing	with	me	available	as	well.	First,	the	solution	given	here	is	parsimonious	in	that	it	appeals	to	psychological	structures	we	have	independent	reason	to	posit	(both	in	making	sense	of	make-believe	and	in	making	sense	of	ritual);	it	is	thus	a	unifying	explanation	(Friedman	1974).	Second																																																									29	To	be	fair,	Boudry	and	Braeckman	do	allow	that	there	can	be	some	active	generation	of	new	religious	ideas.	But	two	points	should	be	made.	First,	their	overall	picture	is	a	fairly	passive	one,	which	sits	ill	with	the	improvisatory	character	of	much	religious	idea	generation.	Second,	to	the	extent	that	they	do	allow	that	religious	idea	generation	can	be	active	(which	I	call	creative	
elaboration)	their	view	does	not	help	someone	who	is	trying	to	use	it	to	object	to	my	view,	since	creative	elaboration	sits	ill	with	evidential	vulnerability	and	is	not	characteristic	of	factual	belief	in	any	case.	
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and	relatedly,	my	view	coheres	with	the	overwhelmingly	supported	view	in	cognitive	science	of	religion	that	religious	cognitions	and	behaviors	are	outcroppings	of	psychological	mechanisms	that	exist	independently	of	religion	(Boyer	2001;	McCauley	2011;	Norenzayan	2013).	Memory	systems,	agent	detection,	in-group/out-group	distinctions,	concern	with	death,	etc.	all	exist	independently	of	religion	(even	broadly	construed),	but	they	all	feed	into	it;	if	I	am	right,	the	same	can	be	said	for	the	psychological	mechanisms	behind	pretend	play:	they	exist	independently	of	religion,	but	they	feed	into	it.	Third,	my	view	helps	explain	the	
active	nature	of	the	content	generation	among	religious	credences.	Much	religious	credence	is	indeed	inherited	from	culture,	but	processes	like	regarding	certain	internal	mental	events	as	the	voice	of	God	are,	as	Luhrmann	would	put	it,	a	matter	of	
choice.	The	Boudry	and	Braeckman	cultural	evolution	model,	though	it	explains	much,	leaves	such	active	choices	unexplained;	such	credence-generating	choices,	however,	are	well	accounted	for	by	my	theory.		One	more	question	remains.	Recall	from	2.1	that	some	people	claim	to	leave	religion	due	to	encounter	with	science.	This	suggests,	prima	facie,	that	their	religious	“beliefs”	were	responsive	to	evidence	after	all.	But	my	view	says	religious	credences	are	not	evidentially	vulnerable.	So	how	am	I	to	make	sense	of	people	leaving	religion	due	to	encounter	with	science?	Of	course,	some	people	may	at	some	point	in	their	lives	have	had	factual	beliefs	with	religious/supernatural	contents,	which	then	got	extinguished	by	evidence	over	time.	This	is	fairly	straightforward.	But	I	don’t	think	that’s	what	is	usually	going	on	when	scientifically	minded	people	leave	religion	(which,	again,	is	not	the	most	usual	trigger	for	people	to	leave	religion	anyway).			 Rather,	I	think	we	have	the	following.	As	we	saw	from	the	intelligent	design	treatment	of	the	second	law	of	thermodynamics,	it	is	quite	possible	for	important	scientific	principles	(or	parts	of	them)	to	fall	in	the	exclusion	class	of	an	instance	of	The	Evidence	Game.	Since	religious	credences	are	identity-constituting	attitudes,	one	holding	them	must	play	the	relevant	games	whenever	one’s	identity	is	in	question.	It	follows	that	if	various	scientific	facts	or	laws	are	in	the	exclusion	class	of	one’s	religious	identity-constituting	game,	one	who	has	the	relevant	religious	credences	is	required	to	publically	ignore	or	alternately	construe	those	facts	and	laws.	And	in	my	view,	many	people	who	are	attracted	to	science	at	some	level	feel	that	The	Evidence	Game’s	frequent	distortion	of	scientific	fact	is	deceptive,	both	of	oneself	and	others.	The	difference	between	the	Evidence	Game	and	normal	games	of	make-believe	is	that,	in	normal	games	of	make-believe,	one	is	allowed	to	whisper,	“This	is	not	actually	real.”	And	one	stops	playing	when	one	feels	like	it.	But	though	the	psychological	mechanisms	of	the	Evidence	Game	parallel	those	of	make-believe	play,	one	is	required	by	religious	identity	to	affirm,	whenever	the	question	arises,	“Yes,	this	is	real.”	Thus,	most	scientifically	minded	people	are	perfectly	happy	with	the	most	outlandish	science	fiction,	precisely	because	after	or	even	during	the	play	they	are	free	to	whisper,	“This	is	not	actually	real.”	But	having,	as	a	matter	of	
identity,	to	say	“Yes,	this	is	real”	about	distortions	of	science	is	apt	to	trigger	revulsion	in	many	people.			 So	this	is	my	explanation	for	why	people	can	be	moved	by	science	to	abandon	religious	credence.	The	games	of	religious	enactment	that	produce	religious	
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credences	(in	many	religious	traditions)	require	following	r-principles	of	generation	that	leave	much	scientific	knowledge	in	the	exclusion	class—and	even	require	distortion	of	it.	If	one	loves	science,	one	will	be	less	inclined	to	play	these	games.				
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